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Abstract
In this study we estimate technical eciency of Indian commercial banks from 1989-
2009 using a multiple-output generalized stochastic production frontier, and analyze the ef-
fects of ﬁnancial sector reforms on measured eciency. This generalized technique estimates
technical eciency in the presence of multiple outputs, ﬁlling a gap in the existing literature.
Our results show that Indian commercial banks were operating with 64% eciency on av-
erage during the sample period and that eciency declined in both public and private banks
during most parts of the post-reform period. The capital adequacy ratios negatively inﬂu-
enced eciency while the number of branches had no signiﬁcant eect on bank eciency.
Financial sector reforms, however, have had mixed results on technical eciency. The initial
phase of reform had positive impact on technical eciency while the later phases adversely
aected technical eciency of commercial banks. Throughout the sample period, public
sector banks show higher eciency levels compared to private sector and foreign banks.
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The goal of this study is to estimate technical eciency of Indian commercial banks and examine
the eects of ﬁnancial sector reforms on the measured eciency. The role of the ﬁnancial sector
in promoting economic growth and development has been widely acknowledged in the litera-
ture (e.g. Schumpeter (1911); Goldsmith (1969); Mckinnon (1973); Shaw (1973); Fry (1978);
King and Levine(1993a, 1993b); Levine (2005)). Studies show that “ﬁnancial repression” or the
existence of rigid government control on interest rate and lending policies of banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions, under-lending, high uncertainty on returns on savings and investments and
misallocation of savings among competing users, among other things, stunts the development
of the ﬁnancial sector and further hinders economic growth in both developed and developing
countries(e.g. Fry(1980, 1997); Haber (2003); Barth et al. (2006); Abiad et al. (2008).
The ﬁnancial sector in post-independence India had all the characteristics of ﬁnancial
repression. Banks were nationalized and there was strong government control over the ﬁnan-
cial market. “The sector was characterized, inter alia, by administered interest rates, large pre-
emption of resources by the authorities and extensive micro-regulations directing the major por-
tion of the ﬂow of funds to and from ﬁnancial intermediaries” (Mohan 2004, p 851). The outcome
was lack of competition, high intermediation costs and hence under-lending, corruption and bu-
reaucratic lethargy (e.g. Banerjee et al. (2004); Mohan (2005); Thomas (2005)). In 1991 the
Indian government launched wide-spread economic liberalization policies which also pervaded
the ﬁnancial sector. Entry barriers were loosened making way for private and foreign banks,
reforms were initiated to improve “ﬁnancial soundness” and bank eciency targeting capital
adequacy requirements, stronger vigilance of the banking sector and several other legal and in-
stitutional factors (Ahluwalia (2002); Mohan (2005)). The banking sector reforms in India were
implemented in two phases, ﬁrst in 1991-92 followed by a second phase in 1998.
India presents an interesting case in the study of bank eciency owing to the co-existence
of a large number of government owned, private and foreign banks in the economy. India’s rapid
economic growth also makes examination of the performance of the banking sector an attractive
subject for research, especially, after the implementation of widespread economic reforms.
2A bank is said to be technically inecient if the actual output is lower than the maximum
possible output level, given available resources. Common causes of such ineciency includes
managerial error or co-ordination failure. The existing literature in this ﬁeld uses mainly two
types of methods to measure technical eciency of banks – Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
The DEA method uses linear programming techniques to measure eciency of produc-
tion units that produce multiple outputs. Several studies use this approach to measure eciency
of Indian banks (see Bhattacharyya, Lovell, and Sahay (1997); Sathye (2003); Das and Ghosh
(2006); Das, Nag, and Ray (2005); Kumar and Gulati (2009)). However, this method fails to cap-
ture the eect of random shocks to the production system. On the other hand, the SFA method
posits two main causes for the deviation of actual output from the maximum possible output,
given the inputs. A part of this deviation is attributed to the symmetric random shocks to a
production system that are not under the control of a producer (e.g., uncertainty about the envi-
ronment, or input market conditions). The other part is attributed to factors such as managerial
error and coordination failures. The existing studies that use SFA to measure dierent types of
eciency of Indian banks either focus on measuring cost and proﬁt eciency in monetary terms
to avoid the problem of considering multiple output (see Sensarma (2006), Zhao et al. (2010)),
or measure technical eciency using a simple production model with one type of output only
(see Shanmugam and Das (2004)). In reality, banks produce many ﬁnancial services (outputs)
using a given set of inputs, and none of the existing studies use the stochastic frontier approach
to measure technical eciency of banks in such a framework.
In this paper, we use the Generalized Stochastic Frontier Production Model that allows
for the possibility of multiple outputs in a production system, as introduced by L¨ othgren(1997),
and measure time-varying technical eciency of Indian banks. Further, we analyze eects of
ﬁnancial reforms and other bank speciﬁc characteristics on the measured eciency scores using
a panel data spanning the period from 1989 to 2009.
Our study ﬁnds that the average technical eciency of both public and private sector
commercial banks in India is low and declined during most parts of the period under considera-
tion, showing an improvement only towards the end of the sample period. Capital adequacy ratio
negatively inﬂuenced technical eciency of Indian commercial banks, particularly, the private
3banks. Although the gradual process of ﬁnancial reforms, as experienced by the country for last
two decades, shows some positive impact on technical eciency of banks in the beginning, the
eect seems to die down thereafter.
Our ﬁnding of a declining trend in eciency levels of Indian banks over time, is in accor-
dance with a study by Das and Ghosh (2006), which uses DEA to measure technical eciency of
Indian banks over the period 1992-2002. Another study by Zhao, Casu, and Ferrari (2010) also
ﬁnds declining cost-eciency in Indian banking over the period from 1992 to 2004. Our study
encompasses a longer period of time than Das and Ghosh (2006) and Zhao et.al. (2010), and uses
a more general technique of eciency measurements as compared to DEA and the traditional
single-output SFA.
The following section brieﬂy outlines the general structure of the Indian commercial
banks and the reform programs that were initiated from the early 1990s. Section 3 presents
details about the data used in this study and the empirical model speciﬁcations. The empirical
ﬁndings are discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2 A Brief Overview of the Indian Banking Sector
India’s banking sector is characterized by public sector banks, private sector banks and foreign
banks. In the 1950s the ﬁnancial sector in India had limited government control on interest
rates and low statutory pre-emption of funds resulting in unequal distribution and misallocation
of credit. This was not only defying the free market mechanism of credit allocation but also
depriving sectors that were in true need of credit (Das and Kumbhakar (2010)). In order to
ensure more equitable distribution of credit, the government tightened its control over banks’
credit allocation procedures and nationalized 20 major commercial banks between 1969-1980
(Das et al. (2005)). Consequently, administered interest rates, large pre-emption of resources by
the authorities and extensive micro-regulations directing the major portion of the ﬂow of funds
to and from ﬁnancial intermediaries, inter alia, characterized the Indian ﬁnancial sector in the
1980s. Government controls and regulations also created strong entry barriers. In the absence of
competition, India’s ﬁnancial sector was rendered inecient and non-competitive creating severe
credit constraints for other sectors of the economy (Mohan (2005), Thomas (2005)).
4Banking sector reforms in India that were initiated in the early 1990s was a gradual and
steady process. One can identify two distinct phases of these reforms. The ﬁrst phase began with
the formation of the Committee on the Financial System (The Narasimhan Committee) in 1991
andthesecondphaseofreformsinitiatedwiththeformationoftheBankingSectorReformsCom-
mittee (Narasimhan Committee II) in 1998. Both committees recommended widespread reforms
forthebankingsystem, capitalmarketsandtheinsurancesector. Bankingsectorreformsincluded
various liberalization policies, such as relaxing controls on interest rates and the sanction of large
loans by the Reserve Bank of India, and policies that promote competition, such as designing
liberal norms for entry of private and foreign banks and insurance companies, and allowing in-
ﬂow of foreign direct investment in the ﬁnancial sector. The reforms also included measures
to improve “ﬁnancial soundness”, like capital adequacy requirements, stronger vigilance of the
banking sector and several institutional and legal measures to improve bank eciency (Ahluwalia
(2002); Mohan (2005)).
These reforms resulted in the expansion of private and foreign banks in India while low-
ering the share of public sector banks’ assets in total bank assets. The share of public sector
banks’ assets in total assets declined from 92% in 1990-91 to 75% in 2003-04; at the same time
the share of private sector banks went up from 4% in 1990-91 to 19% in 2003-04. The fact that
the banking sector became more competitive following the reforms is shown by the reduction in
the ten-ﬁrm concentration ratio of 92.86 in 1991-92 to 62.99 in 2004-05 (Thomas (2005)).
3 Data and Econometric Model Speciﬁcation
3.1 Data
Technical eciency is measured using bank level data from the Prowess database obtained from
Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess has audited ﬁnancial data on ﬁnan-
cial sector companies of which we consider companies providing commercial banking services
only. The data also provides information on bank ownership, namely, public and private and
further categories such as Indian private banks and foreign private banks. Our data consists of an
unbalanced panel of upto 103 commercial banks from 1989-2009.
5The common practice is to adopt either an intermediary approach or a production ap-
proach to measure technical eciency of banks. The two approaches use dierent sets of outputs
and inputs. Based on data availability we follow the intermediary approach, under which banks
produce intermediation services like investments, loans and advances through the collection of
liabilities like deposits. This approach also includes expenses for hiring labor and renting capital
as inputs of the banking system. Hence we estimate technical eciency using bank level data on
three input variables – compensation to employees and capital expenses (calculated by aggregat-
ing expenditures on power and fuel, indirect taxes, rent and lease, repairs, insurance premium,
printing, stationary and depreciation) and deposits accepted by commercial banks. The output of
banks is deﬁned as a mix of investments, and loans and advances. We describe the basic method
to construct the output mix from these two outputs in section 3.2.1
We measure ﬁnancial reforms by constructing dummies for several time periods to take
into account the gradual nature of the liberalization process. The time dummies are 1993-1996,
1998-2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2007. The empirical model that estimates the eects of reforms
on technical eciency of banks also controls for bank speciﬁc factors such as number of branches
and capital adequacy ratio. Number of branches controls for managerial ineciencies that might
set in when a bank has too many branches and negatively aect technical eciency (Das and
Ghosh (2006)). Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) accounts for the degree of capitalization of banks.
Banks with a high capital adequacy ratio can be considered safe, decreasing their cost of borrow-
ing and hence increasing eciency (Das and Ghosh (2006)). On the other hand a high CAR may
imply conservative behavior on the part of banks in terms of lending, leading to lower eciency
(Bhattacharyya et al. (1997)).
Both regression models use logarithmic values of dependent and independent variables
(except time trend and time dummies). Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the data used
in our analysis. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables.
1Appendix B presents the detailed method of constructing the output mix.
63.2 Model Speciﬁcation
We specify a panel data stochastic production frontier model for Indian commercial banks in a
generalized production frontier framework (L¨ othgren(1997)), also known as the Ray Production
Frontier, as discussed in Appendix B. The Ray Production Frontier considers multiple outputs
produced by banks, and constructs an output measure based on the production possibility frontier
representing the relationship among the outputs. The polar co-ordinate angles between the output
vectors play an important role in determining the relationship between the output measure and
inputs. Let i = 1;:::;N be the number of banks, t = 1;:::;T be the number of time periods under
consideration, and p = 1;:::;P be the number of outputs generated by every bank. Assuming
that the banking services are generated by a Cobb-Douglas function2, the generalized stochastic
production model3 is given by
lnkyitk = 0 + z
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uit = technical ineciency of bank i at time t;uit  0
All the variables used in equation (3.2.1) are in their natural logarithmic forms except for the time
trend.
2A ﬂexible form production function can be used as well. However, the technical eciency scores, as calculated
using Cobb-Douglas and Trans-logarithmic production functions, are similar for our data.
3A detailed discussion on the generalized stochastic production frontier is presented in Appendix B.
7We use the Battesse-Coelli (1992) parameterization of the time-varying ineciency term
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 = unknown scalar parameter capturing the variation in technical ineciency with time
I(i) = set of Ti time periods among the T periods involved for which observations for
the ith banks are obtained.
For  > 0 (or  < 0), banks tend to improve (or reduce) their level of technical eciency
over time, and the technical eciency level tends to remain constant over time for  = 0. The
maximum likelihood estimation of (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) is discussed in Battesse and Coelli (1992).
In order to estimate the eects of ﬁnancial reforms on eciency in Indian banks, we
further model the technical eciency scores, using a ﬁxed eects panel data regression model4
which is given by
lnuit = 0 +
m X
j=1
jqjit + "it (3.2.3)
where, qit is a vector of reform dummies and other bank and time speciﬁc explanatory variables
(in logarithmic terms) associated with technical eciency.
To estimate technical eciency scores of each bank at every time period, we ﬁrst estimate
the generalized stochastic production frontier, as described in equation (3.2.1) where the output
norm kyitk is derived using two outputs, viz. investment and loans and advances (ladv), following










4We model technical eciency as a ﬁxed eects model, allowing for the possible correlation between the random
shocks aecting technical eciency of banks and bank speciﬁc factors that inﬂuence eciency. However, the
estimation results for (3.2.3) using a random eects model and a ﬁxed eects model are very similar.
8Inputs used by banks in the production of services like investment and loans and advances are the
deposits accepted by them, capital, and employees. Hence, we include the value of deposits ac-
cepted by commercial banks (deposits), compensation to employees (labor) and capital expenses
(capital) as inputs in the production model. We use the polar-coordinate angle inv(radian) cor-
responding to the output vector “investment” as another determinant of the output norm. Finally,
we capture the eect of technological changes on the production frontier by incorporating the
time trend (yearid) in the production model and estimate the frontier model as
lnkyitk = 0 + 1ln(deposits) + 2ln(labor) + 3ln(capital) + 4ln(inv(rad)) (3.2.5)
+ 5(yearid) + vit   uit
The time-varying technical eciency scores are then estimated using (3.2.2).
In the nextstage, we analyze the eects of ﬁnancial reforms on technical eciency scores.
Since the reforms were implemented in phases, we construct several dummies for dierent time
intervals. The dummies are described below5. We also control for certain bank speciﬁc factors,
namely, number of branches and capital adequacy ratio which may also have inﬂuenced technical
eciency of banks.
lnuit = 0 + 1ln(branches) + 2ln(CAR) + 3(1993   1996) (3.2.6)
+ 4(1998   2001) + 5(2002   2005) + 6(2006   2009) + "it
where,
ln(uit) = ln(technical eciency)
ln(branches) = ln(no. of branches)
ln(CAR) = ln(capital adequacy ratio)
1993   1996 = 1 if 1992 < year < 1997;0 otherwise
1998   2001 = 1 if 1997 < year < 2002;0 otherwise
2002   2005 = 1 if 2001 < year < 2006;0 otherwise
2006   2009 = 1 if 2005 < year;0 otherwise
5Since major phases of reforms were introduced in 1992 and 1997, we measure the eects of reforms post 1992
and 1997 and construct our dummies accordingly.
9We also estimate the above model according to ownership groups and analyze impacts of exoge-
nous variables on the technical eciency scores, separately for each category. For this purpose,
we divide the data as banks owned by the government sector or public sector banks and private
sector (foreign and domestic) banks.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Results of Eciency Analysis
Estimation results for the generalized production frontier model (equations 3.2.5 and 3.2.2) are
presented in Table 2. All three inputs have positive input elasticities. This in turn, also veriﬁes
the positive input monotonicity of the ray production frontier. We also ﬁnd that the sum of
input elasticities (ˆ 1 + ˆ 2 + ˆ 3) is 0.90, indicating that service provision by the Indian Commercial
Banks follows a decreasing returns to scale. The Wald Chi-square test for the null hypothesis that
the production model exhibits constant returns to scale is rejected at 1% signiﬁcance level. The
test results also show that the sum of the input elasticities is signiﬁcantly less than unity, implying
that the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
The signiﬁcantly positive coecient of the polar-coordinate angle indicates that for a
given level of inputs, the frontier output norm depends on the output mix6. Due to the ineciency
eects, theobservedoutputnormisobtainedbyacontractionofthefrontiernorm. Thecoecient
estimate of inv(rad) implies that a decrease in investments on the production frontier results in a
more than proportionate increase in loans and advances. This result is in accordance with the idea
that making investments in assisted companies, shares, mutual funds, and government securities
are more resource consuming than making loans and advances.
The technical eciency scores are calculated using the estimation results from equations
(3.2.5) and (3.2.2) and presented in Table 3.7 We ﬁnd that on average, the eciency scores of
Indian commercial banks are 63.73% during the period 1989-2009.
6The output mix represents the dierent combinations of outputs produced with given resources and technology.
7Since we use 1431 observations on banks and calculate technical eciency of each bank at every time period,
we do not report 1431 such scores. Instead we summarize the estimated technical eciency scores in Table 3.
Appendix D presents technical eciency scores and rank of each bank in our data set.
10The estimated eciency scores suggest that Indian commercial banks were characterized
bylowtechnicaleciencyduringtheperiodunderconsideration. Further, the publicsectorbanks
are found to be technically more ecient compared to private sector banks. Multiple factors ac-
count for this high degree of ineciency. For instance, public sector banks which constitute
about 75% of the ﬁnancial system, even after reforms, had several social goals including promot-
ing employment in the rural areas, lending to the priority sector8 at below-market rates, which
ended up in low return on advances and inecient use of resources from the point of view of out-
put maximization (Das and Ghosh (2006)). Moreover, prevalence of relationship based banking
led to signiﬁcant under-lending by Indian banks (Banerjee et al. (2004)).
The higher technical eciency scores of public sector banks as opposed to private sector
banks, may be the result of public banks catering mostly to government borrowing programs
and hence obtaining “signiﬁcant fee based income from this source”. Additionally, public sector
banks have always enjoyed the beneﬁts of state support, public conﬁdence with respect to safety
of deposits, and provided easy access to subsidized loans to the priority sectors that increase the
amount of output, making the banks more ecient compared to other banks (Das and Ghosh
(2006); Bhattacharyya et al. (1997)).9
Further, the Indian private banks seem to maintain a higher level of eciency than the
foreign private banks in most of the years under consideration. This can be attributed to the fact
that the foreign banks that entered the Indian ﬁnancial market in the early 1990s, needed time
to expand their number of branches and acquire stable deposit bases. These foreign banks did
not enjoy the advantage of having established business structures and infrastructures as the In-
dian public and private banks did. Extensive use of costly technology and massive expenditures
incurred in trying to push retail loans to expand their asset portfolio also resulted in poor perfor-
mance of these foreign banks (Sensarma (2006)). However, 2004 onwards, there has not been a
signiﬁcant dierence in technical eciency of Indian and foreign private banks.
8Priority sectors in India include agriculture, small scale industries, small road and water transport operators,
small business, retail trade, professional and self employed persons, organizations for scheduled castes/tribes, edu-
cation, housing, consumption, software industry etc.
9Adjustment of output of public banks by considering the amount of nonperforming loans may reduce the level
of eciency of these banks. However, due to lack of detailed data on losses of public banks due to subsidized loans
to favored sectors, an in depth examination of this hypothesis is beyond the scopes of this paper.
11Acloserlookatthetimepatternofeachbankrevealsthattechnicaleciencyofindividual
banks followed a declining trend for most parts of the period under consideration. 10 As shown
in Table 3 and Figure 1, estimated technical eciency scores decline over time for public, Indian
private, and foreign private banks. However, starting from the middle of 1990’s, eciency of
the public banks have changed very little, whereas, eciency of both Indian private sector and
foreign private sector banks have fallen considerably, resulting in an overall lower eciency of
private sector banks as compared to the public banks. An upward trend in the eciency of private
banks is observed only after 2006.
We use the eects of ﬁnancial reforms and other bank speciﬁc characteristics (equation
(3.2.6)) to analyze the observed behavior of technical eciency of Indian commercial banks
during the post-reform period. The following subsection presents a discussion of the results.
4.2 Eects of Reforms on Technical Eciency
Table 4 shows the ﬁxed eect estimates of equation (3.2.6). We estimate the model for the
entire banking sector and also for dierent ownership groups. Column (1) shows the estimates
for both public sector and private sector banks. Column (2) presents estimates for public sector
banks only and column (3) for private commercial banks. We estimate the coecient of ﬁnancial
reform dummies 1993-1996, 1998-2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 controlling for the number
of branches and capital adequacy ratio.
Number of branches is statistically insigniﬁcant for All Banks as well as Public and Pri-
vate sector banks. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has signiﬁcant adverse eects on technical
eciency of sample banks. The coecient is interpreted as follows: a one percent increase in
CAR results in a 0:009 percent decrease in technical eciency for all banks (Column (1)). The
estimate is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level. We interpret the coecient for dierent ownership
groups in the same way. The eect is consistent in sign for dierent categories of banks. This
supports the “conservative behavior” hypothesis discussed in Bhattacharyya et al. (1997). A high
CAR implies that banks are signiﬁcantly risk-averse. Low risk is also associated with low return.
A high CAR therefore indicates that banks have a majority low return assets in their portfolio
10Estimated value of  is -0.03 and signiﬁcant at 5% level (see Table 2).
12which adversely aects their technical eciency. Strict CAR requirements prescribed in the
ﬁnancial reforms may be partly responsible for this (Shanmugam and Das (2004)).
The reform dummies accounting for post 1992 and post 1997 banking reform periods are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for “All Banks”. The 1993-1996 dummy is positive and
all other reform dummies are negative showing that there was an initial improvement in technical
eciency due to the reforms followed by consistent decline. These eects are also observed for
both public and private sector banks. Our ﬁndings are consistent with Das et al. (2005) and Zhao
et al. (2010).
The results presented in Table 4 clearly indicates that although both phases of reforms
were aimed at improving bank eciency, the outcomes from the two phases were starkly dier-
ent. A deeper scrutiny of the reforms is thus warranted.
It may be noted that while the 1991-92 reforms aimed at lowering the banks’ regulatory
costs and enhancing competition, the 1997-98 reforms targeted greater ﬁnancial stability. In
other words, the reforms were a combination of both deregulation and “prudential re-regulation”
policies.
The salient features of the 1991-92 reforms include deregulation of interest rates, in-
troduction of risk-asset ratios for banks, simpliﬁcation of lending structures, removal of capi-
tal market restrictions on pricing and issues of capital (Lawrence and Longjam (2003)). These
deregulations had a positive impact on eciency levels of Indian commercial banks, especially
the private sector banks.
The second major phase of reforms launched in 1997-98 focussed more on increasing
bank stability and hence lower risk-taking. The down-side of such regulatory policies is increase
in costs and slow-down in competition (Zhao et al. (2010)). The eect of reforms is also con-
tingent on the performance of the economy in general. For instance, as noted in Banerjee et
al. (2004), changes in regulations also aected the criteria of priority sector lending providing
smaller ﬁrms in the economy with a greater increase in credit limit compared to larger ﬁrms.
After this change was put into eect in 1998, small ﬁrms grew at a rate of 7.6%, while large ﬁrms
grew at a rate of 11.3%; moreover, 5.96% of small ﬁrms as opposed to 2.5% of large ﬁrms in
Mumbai defaulted on their loans – clearly revealing misallocation of loans by banks. The interest
rate charged on these loans was also way below the market rate. The misallocation of loans also
13stemmed from the inability of banks to identify “promising ﬁrms” when the banks were allowed
to have their own independent lending policies in mid-1997. Post 1997 reforms also included
stricter vigilance policies. While this was meant to boost bank conﬁdence, it ended up spreading
a “fear psychosis”, and, banks cut their lending substantially for the fear of being investigated
(Banerjee et al. (2004)).
However, the technical eciency scores, as shown in Table 3, show improvement towards
the end of the sample period. We can therefore conclude that although the reforms have had
varied impact on technical eciency in dierent periods of time and posed challenges to banks
in terms of adjusting to a new set of rules and regulations, the banks have adapted to the changed
environment and started to show improvements in eciency. The slow adjustment is not unusual,
given the time-lag involved between the implementation and eect of any policy.
While we provide some justiﬁcation to the observed behavior in technical eciency of
Indian banks in the post-reform period, we also acknowledge that our models may not capture
some important characteristics of the banking industry due to data constraints. Future research
may aim at including more bank speciﬁc features to analyze the eect of reforms on technical
eciency. Since our results are based on an unbalanced panel we re-estimate our models (equa-
tions (3.2.5) and (3.2.6)) with a balanced panel data as a robustness check of our ﬁndings and
report the results below.
4.3 Robustness Check
We perform a robustness check of our regression models by using a balanced panel for the period
1995-2007. We estimate technical eciency of 46 banks in stage 1 regression and analyze the
eects of ﬁnancial reforms on measured technical eciency scores in the second stage. Tables
5 and 6 in Appendix C report the results of the balanced panel analysis. These results show
that our estimates for the unbalanced panel are robust. Number of branches, however, is now
statistically signiﬁcant and negative for all banks in the sample (column (1)) and private sector
banks (column (3)). The negative value of the estimate shows that technical eciency may suer
due to management ineciencies in the presence of large number of branches, supporting “the
bad-management hypothesis” of Berger and DeYoung (1997).
145 Conclusion
In this study we estimate technical eciency of Indian banks using a multiple-output general-
ized stochastic production frontier and examine eects of economic reforms on the measured
eciency of banks. None of the existing studies in this ﬁeld has used a stochastic frontier frame-
work to measure eciency of banks when banks produce multiple outputs. We ﬁll up this gap in
the literature by using bank-level panel data from 1989-2009, estimating technical eciency of
Indian banks.
Although we have restricted the multiple-output model to using only two types of output
due to data restrictions, the model can be used to include as many outputs as possible. Extending
the model to include more than two outputs may increase the accuracy of the estimates. We also
acknowledge that the inherent limitation of the ray production function is its assumption that the
disturbancetermsaecttheoutputvectormultiplicatively, implyingthatalloutputdimensionsare
proportionallyaectedbythesamedisturbance. However, thisrestrictiveassumptionisnecessary
to allow a modeling of multiple-output and multiple-input technologies. To our knowledge there
is no better method available at present to address this issue.
Our results show that technical eciency of Indian banks are low (64% on average) and
declines consistently before increasing towards the end of the sample period. We speculate the
reasons for low technical eciency to be insucient deposit base for newer banks and too many
social purposes of the government, among others. The 1991-92 reforms included mostly dereg-
ulatory policies and improved technical eciency of banks. The post 1997 reforms put more
emphasis on bank stability and resulted in loss of eciency. The time-lag involved in the imple-
mentation of government policies and slow adjustment of banks to changing ﬁnancial environ-
ment are possible reasons for the later improvement in eciency.
Although we try to control for bank speciﬁc factors like number of branches and capital
adequacy ratio, there may be other important factors such as non-performing assets, rural and
urban banking, bank mergers, bureaucratic sloth and others, which we do not consider, mostly
due to data unavailability.
The ﬁndings of the paper suggest that the ﬁnancial reforms implemented in India in the
early and late 1990s had varied impact on the eciency of the banking sector. The banking sector,
however, continues to show a high degree of ineciency in the post-reform period.
15Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Number of
Deviation Observations
Stage 1
Ln(Output norm) 7.48 2.30 -0.09 13.32 1431
Ln(Deposits) 7.62 2.59 -4.61 13.52 1431
Ln(Labor) 3.60 2.37 -3.91 9.19 1431
Ln(Capital) 2.88 1.95 -3.22 8.00 1431
Ln(inv) -0.20 0.62 -6.47 0.42 1431
Stage 2
Ln(Technical Eciency) -0.40 0.23 -1.82 -0.02 603
Ln(No. of Branch) 6.08 1.49 0.00 9.35 603
Ln(Capital Adequacy Ratio) 2.46 0.37 -2.81 4.10 603
Notes: Stage 1 variables are measured in millions of Indian rupees


















Number of Companyid 125.00
Wald2(5) 7565.12
Notes: ***p<0.01, *p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Coecient estimates of ln(Deposit), ln(Labor), and ln(Capital) represent
elasticity of output with respect to deposit, labor and capital respectively.
Estimated coecient of Yearid represents change in the actual output
due to technological changes over time.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 4: Eects of Financial Reforms on Technical Eciency - Unbalanced Panel
Dependent Variable: Ln(Technical Eciency)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables All Banks Public Private
Ln( No. of Branch) 0.002 -0.013 0.009
(0.005) (0.024) (0.006)
Ln(Capital Adequacy Ratio) -0.009* -0.008 -0.011*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
1993-1996 0.028*** 0.009 0.038***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
1998-2001 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
2002-2005 -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.077***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
2006-2009 -0.103*** -0.087*** -0.131***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Constant -0.333*** -0.154 -0.442***
(0.034) (0.171) (0.030)
Observations 603 319 284
Adj. R-squared 0.718 0.749 0.74
Number of companyid 72 30 42
*** p<0.01, * p<0.10.
Robust standard errors clustered at bank level in parentheses.
A one percent increase in CAR results in a 0:009% decrease in technical eciency
for All banks in the sample.
Estimates of the year-dummies show eects of dierent phases of reforms.
Reform coecient estimates are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level
for All banks in the sample





































A Description of Variables
Investment- Investment in assisted companies, shares, mutual funds, government securi-
ties, etc.
Loans - Loans and advances made by banks.
Deposits - Deposits accepted by commercial banks. There are three types of deposits:
demand deposits, savings deposits and term deposits. This data ﬁeld captures the total
deposits collected and outstanding with the bank.
Labor - Measured by compensation to employees. It includes payments made in cash or
kind by companies to their employees. Such expenses include salaries, bonus, contribution
to provident funds, training costs, and other labor related expenses.
Capital - Sum of expenses on power, fuel and water, payment of indirect taxes e.g. service
tax, rents and lease rents, repair expenses, printing and stationary expenses and deprecia-
tion.
Output - Eucledian norm of two types of output vectors - investment, and loans and ad-
vances.
Capital Adequacy ratio - Banks are required to maintain a certain amount of capital in
relation to other assets, such as, loans and investments as a cover against possible losses in
these assets. Capital adequacy ratio is the percentage of the total capital funds to the total
risk-weighted assets.
21B Generalized Stochastic Production Frontier
A multiple-output generalized stochastic production model (L¨ othgren(1997)) deﬁnes a ray pro-
duction function based on polar coordinates, allowing for the primal-based estimation of multiple
output production frontiers and bank speciﬁc technical eciencies that vary over time. The out-
put mix is represented by the output polar-coordinate angles. For a given output mix and input
level, the generalized production function, also known as the ray production function, gives the
maximum Euclidean norm of the output vector that is attainable given the technology. Formally,
for a production technology with multiple inputs, x 2 Rd
+, that are used to produce multiple out-
puts y 2 R
p
+, the generalized production function represents the output vector in polar-coordinate
form as
y = l  m() (B.0.1)







denotes the Euclidean norm of the outputs, m() = y=kyk
represents the transformation function of the polar-coordinate angles  to the output mix vector.
The function m : [0;=2]
p 1 ! [0;1]





sinj;i = 1;:::; p (B.0.2)
where  2 [0;=2]
p 1, and sin0 = cosp = 1.











C C C C C C A;i = 1;:::; p (B.0.3)
The ﬁrst angle is given by 1 = cos 1 (y1=kyk), which is used in the calculation of the second
angle 2 = cos 1 (y2=kyk sin1).
The remaining angles i;i = 3;:::; p   1 are calculated following continuous recursion.
The ray production function, as illustrated by L¨ othgren(1997), is closely related to the
output distance function in (Shephard (1970)). This output distance function is deﬁned as





+ : x can produce y
	
is the output set. Given weak disposability of
outputs11, the output distance function provides a complete representation of the technology (F¨ are
(1988)) in the sense that
D0(x;y)  1 , y 2 P(x) (B.0.5)
The isoquant of the output set, or the output frontier is deﬁned as
IsoqP(x) = fy : y 2 P(x);y < P(x);y > 1g (B.0.6)
If D0(x;y) = 1, then the output is technically ecient and belongs to the output frontier. On the
other hand, D0(x;y) < 1 signiﬁes technical ineciency or output being lower than the frontier
level.
The ray production function provides a generalization of the single-output production
functiontomultiple-outputtechnologiesasoutputdistancefunction. Formally, therayproduction
function is given by
f(x;) = maxfl  0 : l  m() 2 P(x)g (B.0.7)
The output distance function is given by the ratio of the output norm to the frontier output norm
(F¨ are (1988)). Since, by deﬁnition y = lm() and f(x;)m() belongs to the isoquant (frontier)




f   = kyk=f(x;) (B.0.8)
The curvature of the production frontier can be derived from the partial derivatives of the ray
function with respect to the polar-coordinate angles, @f(x;)=@i;i = 1;:::; p   1.
For a given level of inputs, @f(x;)=@i captures the change in the output norm when the
output mix changes along the frontier (Gerdtham et al. (1999)). For example, for a technology
with three outputs, the ﬁrst angle 1 represents the angle from y1 axis towards the plane spanned
by the y2 and y3 axis. 2 represents the angle between y2 and y3 in the y2   y3 plane. Therefore,
the derivative @f(x;)=@(1) represents the change of the frontier output norm for changes in
11Weak disposability of outputs implies that proportional reduction in inputs is feasible.
23the output mix along the output frontier with ﬁxed proportions between y2 and y3. Similarly,
@f(x;)=@(2) represents the change of the frontier output norm for changes in the output mix
with the level of y1 held constant. A ray production function for a two-output technology is






Figure 2: P(x) is the output set. The output mix of the output y is represented by the angle . yf = f(x;)m()is the
ray production function or the frontier output. Output y is technically inecient.
24C Balanced Panel Regression Results


















Number of companyid 46.00
Wald2(5) 4303.76
Notes: ***p<0.01, *p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
Coecient estimates of ln(Deposit), ln(Labor), and ln(Capital) represent
elasticity of output with respect to deposit, labor and capital respectively.
Signs of estimated  implies the direction of change in technical
eciency over time.
25Table 6: Eect of Reforms on Technical Eciency - Balanced Panel (1995-2007)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Technical Eciency)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables All Banks Public Private
Ln(No. of Branch) -0.093* -0.054 -0.114**
(0.049) (0.046) (0.048)
Ln(Capital Adequacy Ratio) -0.014** -0.019 -0.014***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
1998-2000 -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.107***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.021)
2001-2003 -0.197*** -0.184*** -0.240***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.024)
2004-2007 -0.356*** -0.333*** -0.420***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.030)
Constant -0.016 -0.179 -0.104
(0.325) (0.337) (0.252)
Observations 313 212 101
Adj. R-squared 0.889 0.897 0.898
Number of companyid 35 22 13
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10.
Robust standard errors clustered at bank level in parentheses.
26D Table: Average Bank Technical Eciency Scores
Average Technical Eciency Scores of Banks – Highest to Lowest
Bank TE Rank
I D B I Bank Ltd 97.82 1
Bank of Nova Scotia 94.04 2
British Bank of the Middle East 93.91 3
Antwerp Diamond Bank N V 93.91 4
State Bank of India 93.11 5
Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 92.07 6
I C I C I Bank Ltd. 92.06 7
Indusind Bank Ltd. 91.38 8
Bank of India 89.19 9
Global Trust Bank 84.94 10
Oriental Bank of Commerce 84.34 11
Sakura Bank Ltd. 84.13 12
Credit Lyonnais 82.98 13
UCO Bank 82.66 14
Union Bank of India 81.87 15
State Bank of Patiala 81.8 16
Bank of Baroda 81.69 17
Indian Overseas Bank 80.71 18
Canara Bank 80.62 19
Axis Bank Ltd. 80.44 20
Central Bank of India 80.28 21
State Bank of Hyderabad 79.88 22
Punjab National Bank 79.68 23
Bank of America 79.64 24
Corporation Bank 79.53 25
continued on next page
27Table continued from previous page
Bank TE Rank
United Bank of India 78.36 26
Federal Bank Ltd. 78.08 27
Karnataka Bank Ltd. 77.48 28
State Bank of Travancore 76.53 29
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 76.01 30
Allahabad Bank 74.91 31
Syndicate Bank 74.78 32
Indian Bank 74.51 33
American Express Intl. Banking Corpn. 73.61 34
State Bank of Indore 72.07 35
J P Morgan Chase Bank 70.81 36
H D F C Bank Ltd. 69.84 37
Vijaya Bank 69.36 38
Pinakini Grameena Bank 68.98 39
Bank of Maharash 68.77 40
I D B I Bank Ltd. 68.75 41
Toronto-Dominion Bank 68.34 42
I N G Vysya Bank 68.29 43
Andhra Bank 68.13 44
State Bank of Mysore 67.63 45
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 67.55 46
Karur Vysya Bank 67.03 47
Yes Bank Ltd. 66.83 48
A B N-Amro Bank N V 66.8 49
U F J Bank Ltd. 66.22 50
Punjab & Sind Bank 66.09 51
South Indian Bank 65.82 52
continued on next page
28Table continued from previous page
Bank TE Rank
Citibank N A. 65.74 53
Standard Chartered Bank 65.39 54
City Union Bank 65.33 55
United Western Bank 64.92 56
Societe Generale 64.64 57
Sumitomo Bank Ltd. 64.42 58
Dena Bank 63.86 59
Calyon Bank 63.79 60
State Bank of Saurashtra 63.28 61
Banque Nationale de Paris 62.84 62
Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Ltd. 62.18 63
State Bank of Mauritius Ltd. 60.86 64
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 60.72 65
Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 58.61 66
Times Bank Ltd. 57.82 67
Bank of Punjab Ltd. 57.67 68
Development Credit Bank Ltd. 56.48 69
Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 55.26 70
Deutsche Bank A G 55.11 71
D B S Bank Ltd. 54.48 72
Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd. 54.39 73
S B I Commercial & International Bank Ltd. 54.15 74
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi U F J Ltd. 53.1 75
Benares State Bank Ltd. 52.82 76
Siam Commercial Bank 51.88 77
Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd. 51.4 78
Bank of Madura Ltd. 51.34 79
continued on next page
29Table continued from previous page
Bank TE Rank
Nedungadi Bank Ltd. 51.06 80
Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 50.55 81
Sangli Bank Ltd. 50.21 82
Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. 50 83
Centurion Bank of Punjab Ltd. 49.67 84
Barclays Bank Plc. 49.52 85
B N P Paribas 49.51 86
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 49.24 87
Bank of Ceylon 48.38 88
Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. 47.78 89
Ganesh Bank of Kurundwad Ltd. 46.15 90
Bank of Bahrain 45.75 91
Chase Manhattan Bank N A 45.57 92
Mashreqbank P S C 45.47 93
Nainital Bank Ltd. 44.27 94
Vinayak Local Area Bank Ltd. 43.33 95
Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. 43.22 96
Bareilly Corporation Bank Ltd. 42.16 97
Oman International Bank 41.75 98
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corpn. 38.6 99
American Express Bank Ltd. 38.43 100
Ratnakar Bank Ltd. 36.39 101
Santhal Parganas Gramin Bank 36.22 102
I N G Bank N V 35.93 103
Karad Urban Co-op Bank Ltd. 35.73 104
Mapusa Urban Co-op Bank Ltd. 35.69 105
Shinhan Bank 35.22 106
continued on next page
30Table continued from previous page
Bank TE Rank
Cho Hung Bank 33.81 107
Commerzbank A G 32.92 108
Bank Muscat S A 32.83 109
Chinatrust Commercial Bank 32.37 110
Mahakaushal Kshetriya Gramin Bank 32.17 111
Capital Local Area Bank Ltd. 30.94 112
K B C Bank N V. 30.35 113
Shri Arihant Co-op Bank Ltd. 29.21 114
Dresdner Bank A. G. 26.14 115
Sree Narayana Guru Co-op Bank Ltd. 22.39 116
Bank International Indonesia 21.52 117
Krishna Bhima Bank Ltd. 18.11 118
A B Bank Ltd. 17.05 119
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corpn. Ltd. 16.77 120
Shreeji Bhatia Co-op Bank Ltd. 16.47 121
Bank Muscat Al Ahli 14.9 122
Krung Thai Bank 11.81 123
South Gujarat Local Area Bank Ltd. 10.69 124
Sonali Bank 8.04 125
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